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Abstract
Over the last two decades electricity sectors in both developed and developing
countries have been subject to restructuring to introduce private capital and increase
competition. Although the effects of such reforms in a number of the developed
economies are now well documented, apart from a few case studies the experience of
developing countries is much less well researched. This paper provides an
econometric assessment of the effects of privatisation, competition and regulation on
the performance of the electricity generation industry using panel data for 36
developing and transitional countries, over the period 1985 to 2003. The study
identifies the impact of these reforms on generating capacity, electricity generated,
labour productivity in the generating sector and capacity utilisation. The main
conclusions are that on their own privatisation and regulation do not lead to obvious
gains in economic performance, though there are some positive interaction effects. By
contrast, introducing competition does seem to be effective in stimulating
performance improvements.
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31. Introduction1
In the last twenty years, a large number of developed and developing countries have
introduced major electricity sector reforms which have altered significantly the
sector’s market structure and institutional framework. This increase in private
participation in the electricity sector was accompanied by a change in thinking on how
utilities should be organised and regulated (Newbery, 1999; Gomez-Ibanez, 2003).
Power sector reform has usually involved some combination of product market
competition, privatisation and regulation. In developed countries, the process of
reform in the electricity sector has been well documented and appears to have been
reasonably successful (Pollitt, 1995; Newbery, 1999) In developing countries,
however, the path to reform has been more difficult. Developing countries can suffer
from serious institutional weaknesses, meaning that planned reforms may not produce
their intended benefits (Parker, 2002). In most developing countries the process of
capacity building and establishing adequate regulatory institutions has been a slow
and complex one, lagging behind the entry of private operators in the electricity
sector (World Bank, 2003, pp. ix-x; Cubbin and Stern, 2006; Zhang, Parker and
Kirkpatrick, 2005).
The motivation for this paper is to examine the separate effects of privatisation,
competition and regulation as components of electricity sector reform on performance
in developing countries. In doing so, we deploy a new and hitherto unused panel
database, which provides separate measures of the level of privatisation, competition
and regulation in the electricity sector in 36 developing and transitional economies
over the period 1985 to 2003. The aim of the analysis is to improve our understanding
of the determinants of performance improvements in electricity sectors in developing
countries and thereby contribute to the design of better reform programmes.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the impetus for electricity
reform in developing countries, describes the typical components of reform and
1 We would like to thank two referees for their constructive comments on an earlier draft of the paper.
We also thank Tony Boardman, Dieter Bös, Michael Crew, Monica Giuiletti, Richard Green, Graeme
4provides a review of relevant empirical studies on the effects of competition,
privatisation and regulation. Section 3 generates a number of research hypotheses
and Section 4 then addresses data issues and discusses the modelling used to test the
hypotheses. The results are presented in section 5. The last part of the paper, section
6, provides a discussion of the results and summarises the main conclusions and
policy implications.
2. Reform of the Electricity Sector in Developing Countries
The principal driving forces behind electricity reforms have been discussed in the
literature (for example, Bacon, 1995; World Energy Council, 1998; Czamanski, 1999;
APERC, 2000; Bacon and Besant-Jones, 2001). Following Jamasb, et al. (2004), we
can distinguish between ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors. The former category includes the
poor performance of state-run electricity operators in terms of high costs, inadequate
expansion of access to electricity services and unreliable supply; the inability of the
state sector to meet the investment and maintenance costs of the electricity industry
associated with the increasing demands for power resulting from economic
development in other sectors of the economy; the need to remove electricity subsidies
so as to release resources for other areas of public expenditure; and the desire to raise
immediate revenue for the government through the sale of state assets. The ‘pull’
factors have included: the demonstration effects of the pioneering reforms of the
power sectors in Chile, England and Wales and Norway in the 1980s and early 1990s;
advocacy of reform by international financial organisations and donor agencies such
as the IMF and World Bank, through their ‘lending for institutional reform’
programmes; and rapid changes in technology in both the generation of electricity
and in the computing systems used to meter and dispatch power, making new
industrial structures possible.
The reform programmes adopted by countries have tended to include the following
three main elements:
Hodge, Bill Megginson, Jon Stern, David Saal and attendees at a DFID workshop for helpful
comments on earlier versions of this paper. The usual disclaimer applies.
51. Restructuring the industry in order to enable the introduction of
competition. This means breaking up, or ‘unbundling’, the incumbent
monopoly utilities, possibly into separate generation, transmission,
distribution and retail suppliers of electricity.
2. Privatisation of the unbundled generators, transmitters, distributors or
suppliers.
3. Development of a new regulatory framework. Instead of direct regulation
by a government department, the establishment of ‘independent’ or quasi-
independent regulatory bodies, in the forms of offices and commissions,
has been favoured, drawing particular on the regulatory models of the
USA and UK (Spiller, 1996; Schmitz, 2001)
While the reform programmes for the electricity sector have been built around these
three elements, the detail has varied to reflect local circumstances (Bacon and Besant-
Jones, 2001; World Bank, 2004). For example, privatisation of power has occurred in
the form of operating concessions and greenfield investments, as well as state asset
sales, but has rarely involved complete transfer of the entire electricity supply chain to
the private sector, as occurred in Britain. The result is electricity systems with private
and public ownership co-existing. Also, the degree of competition permitted can vary
depending on which restructuring model has been used, for example the single-buyer
model, wholesale competition (which can itself take various forms), or retail
competition (Lovei, 1996; Hunt and Shuttleworth, 1996). Finally, regulation can take
many shapes (Gilbert and Khan, 1996; Stern and Holder, 1999) and, as Crew and
Kleindorfer note (1996, p.215), the need for workable solutions can lead to the design
and implementation of regulatory systems that are not necessarily in line with
economic theory.
A number of studies have examined the effects of privatisation on economic
performance in developing countries (Megginson and Netter, 2001; Parker and
Kirkpatrick, 2005). The conclusions of these studies are broadly consistent in
showing that ownership alone does not generate economic gains. This conclusion is
supported by studies that have found that competition is associated with lower costs,
lower prices and higher productive efficiency (Bouin and Michalet, 1991) and that the
success or failure of the privatisation of monopolies depends on the post-privatisation
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and Spiller, 1996; Villalonga, 2000). Megginson and Netter’s (2001) recent review
of the privatisation literature suggests that, on balance, in the utilities sector
deregulation and market liberalisation are associated with efficiency improvements,
but that the effect of privatisation by itself is less obvious. Studies by Wallsten (2001),
Gutierrez and Berg (2000) and Bortolotti et al. (2002) of telecommunications across a
number of countries report similarly that privatisation alone is associated with few
performance improvements and that effective regulation and competition are
important.
There is a limited literature that focuses on the impact on economic performance of
reform in the electricity sector in developing countries (Jamasb, et al. 2004). The
standard structure-conduct-performance model has been used to test the effect of
market structure, institutional factors and reform measures, on economic performance.
These three main types of determinants have been tested in a number of combinations
and a wide range of variables has been used to represent market structure, institutional
factors and sector reforms. Similarly, a number of different performance measures
have been adopted. A particularly important study is that by Bortolotti et al. (1998),
who use data on the privatisation of electricity generation in 38 countries (both
developed and developing) between 1977 and 1997. They conclude that effective
regulation is crucial to the success of privatisation (also see Pollitt, 1997). Steiner
(2000) uses a panel data set for 19 OECD countries and dummy variables for market
liberalisation, ownership and privatisation of generation, along with variables for
vertical integration, the existence of an electricity market and consumer choice. She
finds that market liberalisation led to lower prices and that capacity utilisation was
higher under private ownership and vertical unbundling.
Turning to other relevant studies, Hawdon (1996), analysing the performance of
power sectors supported by World Bank loans, found that those countries adopting
privatisation had significantly higher efficiency than the non-privatising group.
However, causation was unclear: ‘privatisation was adopted by those least in need of
efficiency gains’ (ibid., p.28). In a comparison of electricity production in 27
7developing countries in 1987, and using DEA analysis,2 Yunos and Hawdon (1997)
found that public sector suppliers performed as well as private sector companies;
although in none of the countries studied had effective competition been introduced.
Bergara, et al. (1997) composed two political indexes to examine the effect of
institutions on electric utility investment. They found that well-defined and credible
political institutions were positively and significantly correlated with global electricity
generating capacity. Cubbin and Stern (2006) assessed for 28 developing countries
over the period 1980-2001 whether the existence of a regulatory law and higher
quality regulatory governance are significantly associated with superior electricity
outcomes. Their empirical analysis concludes that a regulatory law and higher quality
governance are positively and significantly associated with higher per capita
generation capacity levels and that this positive effect increases over time as
experience develops and regulatory reputation grows. Domah et al (2002) empirically
estimated a translog cost function which specified a model of the determinants of staff
numbers that reflect the complexity of the electricity system, and national economic
and regulatory environments. They found that developing countries faced high fixed
costs relative to market size in establishing independent regulatory agencies.
Overall, therefore, the available empirical evidence suggests that in assessing the
results of electricity privatisation in developing countries the effects of competition
and regulation also need to be taken into account. However, previous studies have
tended to look at only one or maybe two of these three reforms without controlling for
the others and considering possible interaction effects. For this study a data set was
created that allowed for the measure of these separate effects and their possible
interactions.
3 The Research Hypotheses
This section of the paper develops a number of hypotheses as to the effects of
privatisation, competition and regulation in electricity generation, which are then
tested empirically in the next section of the paper.
2 Data envelopment analysis: a form of frontier efficiency measurement using a non-stochastic method.
83.1 Hypotheses on privatisation
The new institutional economics (North, 1990; Levy and Spiller, 1996) provides
important insights into the incentive effects of different types of ownership structure.
Other streams of thought that are relevant to forming a hypothesis of the impact of
privatisation on economic performance are agency and public choice theories
(Niskanen, 1971; Zeckhauser and Horn, 1989; Boycko and Vishny, 1996). In brief,
privatisation is expected to raise economic efficiency by (1) changing the allocation of
property rights, which leads to a different structure of incentives for management and
hence to changes in managerial behaviour; (2) removing the ‘soft budget’ constraint
of taxpayer support and exposing enterprises to the disciplines of the private capital
market (Alchian, 1965; De Alessi, 1980); (3) introducing more precise and
measurable objectives, thus reducing transaction costs, especially associated with
principals monitoring management (agent) behaviour; and (4) removing political
interference in the management of enterprises and capture by special interest groups
(Boycko and Vishny, 1996).
Most of the theoretical arguments for privatisation are concerned with the effects on
productive efficiency. It is expected, for example, that privatisation will lead to higher
labour productivity and higher utilisation of the available capital stock. When
applying the theoretical insights into aspects of economic performance in the
electricity sector, however, specific features of that sector need to be taken into
account. The electricity utility industry is characterised by large sunk investments and
non-storable outputs. These factors provide governments (either national or local)
with the possibility of behaving opportunistically vis-à-vis the investing company.
Knowing that under some circumstances governments may not be able to refrain from
reneging on explicit or implicit agreements and behaving opportunistically, private
investors may be cautious about investing in capacity. As a result, the actual effect of
privatisation on generation-capacity expansion and use is not clear, although one of
the expectations of governments pursuing privatisation is that it will lead to more
capital invested.
From the above arguments the following two hypotheses are derived:
Hypothesis P1: Privatisation will lead to higher labour productivity and higher
capital utilisation.
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provided that the regulatory regime is supportive of investor confidence.
3.2 Hypotheses on competition
In the economics literature competition is regarded as a reliable mechanism for
stimulating both allocative and technical efficiency (Leibenstein, 1966). In a
competitive market, prices and profits reveal important information about the costs of
a firm and the efficiency of input use, thus providing the firm with incentives to
improve internal efficiency (Hayek, 1945). As a result, it is to be expected that
competition will lead to higher electricity generation per employee. Moreover, lower
per-unit costs resulting from increased technical efficiency may be passed through in
lower prices, thus increasing the quantity demanded. Therefore, competition is likely
to have positive effects on both the quantity of electricity supplied and capacity
expansion.
The following two hypotheses are therefore relevant on the effects of competition:
Hypothesis C1: Competition will lead to higher labour productivity and higher
capacity utilisation.
Hypothesis C2: Competition will lead to a larger capacity and a higher output in
electricity generation.
It is, of course, possible that in large firms, prevalent in the electricity sector,
managerial discretion and “x-inefficiency” may mean that competition does not have
the expected results.
3.3 Hypotheses on regulation
Electricity generation is characterised by long-term sunk investments, which is why
an effective regulatory system is crucial for both investor confidence and consumer
protection. The primary purpose of a well-designed regulatory system is to protect
consumers from monopoly abuse, while providing investors with protection from
arbitrary political action and incentives to promote efficient operation and investment
(Laffont and Tirole, 1993). Carefully designed regulation can be expected, therefore,
to be a key component of a successful process of electricity privatisation.
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Regulation can affect a firm’s efficiency. Regulation that is too onerous will
negatively affect a firm’s input (Averch and Johnson, 1962) and output decisions and
depress productivity. Private operators will be unwilling to invest and will produce
less under risky regulatory conditions (Gupta and Sravat, 1998; Holburn, 2001). At
the same time, clearly stated regulatory rules within a well-defined regulatory
framework can be expected to reduce ‘regulatory risk’ and provide incentives for
private investment and this is the main objective when ‘independent’ regulatory
bodies are established. Such expectations lead to the following two hypotheses:
Hypothesis R1: Independent regulation in place of direct government
department regulation will improve labour productivity and capacity utilisation.
Hypothesis R2: Independent regulation will also raise investment in the industry
leading to more capacity and more electricity generated.
4. Data and Modelling
The above hypotheses were tested using panel data for 36 developing and transitional
economies over the period from 1985 to 2003.3 The starting date for the study, 1985,
was dictated by data availability; although this is not a problem because little reform
of the electricity sector occurred before this date. The final date, 2003, represented the
last year for which data were available at the time the research was conducted. The
choice of the sample countries was based on access to data and especially information
on privatisation, competition and regulation. Even so, not all data exist for all of the
years for all 36 countries and therefore the sample size differs depending on the
performance indicator used in a particular estimation (the sample sizes are given when
the results are reported in table 2 below and vary between 644 and 347). Again for
data availability reasons, we focus on electricity generation. However, given that
privatisation has been concentrated in power generation, with three quarters of private
investment in power generation plants (Izaguirre, 1998,p.4), this is not a serious
limitation to the study.
3 The countries are: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China,
Columbia, Costa Rica, Czech Rep., Dominican Rep., Ecuador, El Salvador, Gabon, Honduras, Hong
Kong China, Hungary, Indonesia, Kenya, Latvia, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua,
Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Zambia. Details of
the dates of competition, regulation and privatisation can be obtained from the authors.
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The performance indicators used in the study are net electricity generation per capita
of the population, installed generation capacity per capita of the population, net
electricity generation per employee in the industry and electricity generation to
average capacity (capacity utilisation). These indicators capture the extent of
electricity available to the economy, labour productivity and capacity utilisation in the
generation of electricity. Another potentially useful measure of performance, quality
of service, could not be estimated because of a lack of data. Similarly, we would like
to have investigated the impact of reforms on the prices charged for electricity
generated, but there is a lack of sufficient comparable data across our sample of
countries to carry out such an analysis.4 The indicators of generation, capacity and
capital efficiency were calculated based on data from the Asia Pacific Energy
Research Centre (APERC) database and the World Development Indicators published
by the World Bank. The employment data used to calculate labour efficiency were
compiled from the Industrial Statistics Yearbook (various years) and the database of
the International Labour Organisation.5 The privatisation, competition and regulatory
variables were constructed according to reports in The Yearbook of Privatisation
(various years), Energy Information Administration (EIA) publications, World Energy
Council (WEC), APERC publications and databases published by the World Bank.
The privatisation variable used in the study was constructed as the percentage of
generating capacity owned by private investors. Data on total generation capacity
were drawn from the World Bank Development Indicators. Data on privately owned
generating capacity were calculated based on the database of Private Participation in
4 In an earlier stage of the research we used cruder proxies for privatisation, competition and regulation
than used in this paper, in which a dummy variable simply indicated whether the economy had any
private sector generation capacity; the measure of competition was a dummy variable that equalled 1
either when there existed a wholesale market where generators competed to conclude supply contracts
with distributors or where large users could negotiate contracts directly with generators; and a dummy
variable was employed to indicate whether a country claimed to have an electricity regulatory agency
not directly under the control of a Ministry. The use of these broader measures allowed for the
inclusion of a larger data base (consisting of 51 countries rather than 36) and permitted an analysis of
price effects in a sub-set of these countries. The findings suggested that competition was the main
influence on prices but more especially for industrial users rather than domestic consumers. The earlier
results can be obtained from the authors.
5 For those countries where data on employment in the generation subsector were not available, the
number of employees was estimated by applying the average ratio of generation employment to
total sector employment to the available data on total electricity sector employment.
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Infrastructure (PPI) published by the World Bank. It should be noted that data on
investment in the PPI database include private and public sector contributions.
However, detailed inspection of the PPI database indicated that at least 80% of the
investment in the projects reported in the database came from the private sector
(Kirkpatrick et al, 2006, forthcoming)
The measure of competition was constructed on the basis of the market share of the
three largest generators in the sector. Data on the share for 20 of the 36 sample
countries came from the Electricity Regulation Database published by the World
Bank. Information for the other countries was mainly drawn from the Country Briefs
of the US Energy Information Administration and the Latin American Energy
Organisation (OLADE).6 Particular difficulties arise in measuring regulation for the
purposes of empirical study. There is limited published information on the forms of
regulation adopted in particular developing countries and, in any event, practice may
be different to the published information. In this study, we constructed a four-
component index of regulatory governance in the electricity sector. The four elements
are: (1) whether there is an electricity or energy law; (2) whether the regulator claims
to be independent; (3) whether there is a fixed-term appointment for the head of the
regulatory body, as fixed terms appointments may provide more independence from
political manipulation; and (4) whether the finance of the regulator depends on licence
fees and levies rather the government funding. The first three components are all
represented by binary dummies in our model. The last element takes a value between
0 and 1, with 0 indicating that the regulator is financed completely by government
budget and 1 meaning that it relies totally on levies. Data for constructing the index
came from the Electricity Regulation Database, the International Directory of Utility
6 In a competitive market, the percentage of the market supplied by the largest producers can be a good
proxy of competition. However, in infrastructure industries like electricity, this proxy may exaggerate
the extent of market competition. For example, the electricity sector in a country which has been
unbundled may have several generators, not all of whom serve the same geographic market. In order to
reduce this potential bias in the market share proxy for competition, the competition variable used in
the study was transformed and rebased using logarithms and the square root of the market share. The
results were consistent with those reported here; which are also consistent with the alternative
competition proxy used in an earlier version of this paper. As mentioned already, this reflected the
existence of a wholesale market where generators competed to conclude supply contracts with
distributors or where large users could negotiate contracts directly with generators. None of the
competition proxies used is perfect, but the use of different variables producing the same broad results
gives confidence that we have not seriously misspecified the degree of competition.
13
Regulatory Institutions, and the Country Briefs of the US Energy Information
Administration.
In the model a time-specific residual was included to capture the time effect.7 Also, a
number of variables were included in the model as environmental controls. In
particular, both an increase in GDP per capita and the share of the population living
in urban areas can be expected to be associated with a higher demand for electricity,
thus inducing higher investment by utilities.8 Other control variables included the
percentage of industrial output as a share of GDP and a variable to measure a
country’s ‘economic risk’. A large proportion of industrial customers implies a higher
potential for co-generation and a more even demand for electricity, and, ceteris
paribus, a reduction in the need for generation capacity. The economic risk variable
measures the quality of governance in five areas (the size of government, legal
structure and security of property rights, access to sound money, freedom to trade
internationally and regulation of credit, labour and business ), and can be interpreted
as a proxy for wider political and institutional factors associated with performance
improvement, independent of privatisation, competition and independent regulation.9
The openness of an economy, measured as the percentage of GDP accounted for by
exports, was included as an additional control variable, and acts as a proxy for the
economy’s integration with rules-based international transactions. The
macroeconomic and demographic variables came from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators and the economic risk variable was based on the 10-point
indices published by the Fraser Institute. Table 1 lists the independent variables used
in the study.10
7 We also ran regressions with the time trend as an independent variable instead of as a composite error
term and the results were similar. Ideally, we would have liked to have used leads and lags of the
reform variables but were unable to do so given the number of observations and therefore the degrees
of freedom.
8 Admittedly, over the long run there could be a causation problem here: GDP per capita and
urbanisation may result from increased electricity generated because of the economic gains from
electrification. However, the study deals with a relatively short period in which these long-run
causation effects are unlikely to seriously bias the results.
9 A number of studies have confirmed the influence of such political and institutional factors on private
investment in the utilities sector (Guitierrez and Berg,2000; Hamilton 2000; Henisz and Zelner, 2001;
Kirkpatrick et al 2006).
10 The correlation matrix for the independent variables is provided in the appendix table A1. The
descriptive statistics for the variables used in the study are given in appendix table A2.
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(Table 1 here.)
The model employed in this study draws from those used in Ros (1999) and Wallsten
(2001) for telecommunications and Bergara et al. (1997) for electricity. All non-index
and non-percentage variables used in the study took the log form. A fixed-effects
panel model that controls for country effects and time effects was used.11 The model
is:
ittiititititiit uvxPGCRy   )()()()(ln 321 (1)
where ity is each of the electricity indicators discussed above; ititit PCR ,, are the
regulation, competition and privatisation variables, respectively; itx denotes the
control variables; iv is the unit-specific residual that differs between countries but
remains constant for any particular country; while tu captures the time effect and
therefore differs across years but is constant for all countries in a particular year; it is
the remainder of the disturbance.
As noted above, privatisation, competition and regulation may interact to result in
performance improvements. To explore interaction effects, model (2) was also
estimated:
ittiititititititititititiit uvxPGCPGRCRPGCRy   )()*()*()*()()()(ln 554321
(2)
Model (2) allows for both the separate effects of the reform variables and their
interactions to be examined.
The variables proved to be stationary over the period studied, thus reducing the
danger of spurious regressions. The unit root test (IPS test) for the panel structure of
11 According to Kennedy (1992), the use of the fixed-effects model is reasonable when the sample data
are large relative to the entire population, as in our case. Also, the Hausman test showed that the fixed-
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data proposed by Im et al. (1995) was used. Countries with missing data were first
singled out and balanced panel datasets were obtained. These were subsequently
tested using the IPS method. Because the periods covered by the data for the countries
with missing data are relative short, this meant that excluding these countries from the
unit root test did not exert a significant effect on the general results. The results from
the unit root tests are listed in the appendix table A3.12
The variables for privatisation, competition and regulation may be endogenously
determined. In other words, privatisation, competition and regulation may influence
each other, as well as the performance of the electricity sector. For example, the
poorly performing generators may be privatised first because governments are keen to
get rid of them, while better performing generators are sold off more slowly leaving
time to introduce prior changes to the regulatory and competitive environment. Our
analysis deals to some extent with this potential problem by including country and
year fixed effects. The country fixed effects control for country-specific propensities
to reform and matters such as institutional quality, and year fixed effects control for
any general trend in the reform of electricity generation.13
5. The Results
Models (1) and (2) were estimated for each of the dependent variables, namely,
electricity generation per capita, installed generation per capita, electricity generation
per employee, and electricity generation to average installed capacity. The Prais-
Winsten transformation was used to overcome the problem of autocorrelation in the
initial estimations. Table 2 presents the regression results.
(Table 2 here.)
effect model was superior for the purposes of our study. The Hausman test results can be obtained from
the authors.
12 We also ran Seemingly Unrelated Regressions, as proposed by a referee. The results were similar to
those reported in Table 2. The SUR results can be obtained from the authors on request.
13 We are grateful to a referee for raising the issue of endogeneity. Instrumental variables have been
used in the literature to correct for this potential bias, however, as Jamasb et al. (2004) point out, the
major challenge is identifying appropriate instrumental variables and collecting data on them.
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Electricity generation per capita
The first two columns of Table 2 show the results for the regressions using the log
form of electricity generation per capita. In both of the equations the regulation
variable (R) and the privatisation variable (P) are statistically insignificant. This
suggests that regulatory reform or private investment, on their own, is not sufficient to
increase the availability of electricity in our sample of developing and transitional
countries. Indeed, both variables have an unexpected negative sign suggesting that
these reforms on their own may actually reduce electricity output. The negative
coefficient for the privatisation variable may be explained by the fact that the primary
objective of private investors is to make profits. In contrast, under state ownership the
objective may be to provide electricity to as many individuals as possible, sometimes
at prices well below costs. Possibly privatisation would then lead to lower output, at
least in the short term. The result for regulation is less easy to explain, but may
indicate that imposing an independent regulator where state ownership persists is
ineffective. However, in both cases the coefficient values are statistically insignificant
and therefore not too much should be read into these results.
When the interaction variable between regulation and privatisation (PR) is considered,
there appears to be a positive correlation, significant at the 10% level. In other words,
although not significant when considered separately, private involvement in electricity
generation together with regulatory reforms is associated with an increase in
electricity generation per capita. This finding is consistent with the view that
privatisation of electricity generation increases output where independent regulation
exists to reduce the threat of ‘hold up’.
Turning to the effects of competition, competition among generators (C) is found to
be positively associated with electricity generation per capita in both of the
estimations, i.e. with or without the inclusion of interaction effects, and has the largest
coefficient of any of the reforms. Hence, it seems that competition is an effective
driver of increased electricity production. However, the interaction terms between
privatisation and competition (PC) and regulation and competition (RC) are not
statistically significant and in the case of regulation and competition the coefficient
has an unexpected negative sign. These results suggest that it is competition on its
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own rather than competition and ownership change or competition and the
establishment of an effective regulatory framework that is critical in explaining
increased electricity output in our sample.
As expected, GDP per capita is positively correlated with electricity generation as is
the degree of openness of the economy, as reflected in the exports variable. Also as
expected, the larger the degree of industrialisation in a country the higher the average
amount of electricity generation available to each citizen. The urbanisation variable
was not statistically significant and nor was the economic risk variable.
Installed generation capacity per capita
The regression results on installed capacity per capita in Table 2 (columns 3 and 4)
are similar to those for electricity generation per capita. Again, the competition
variable (C) seems to have a significant, positive effect on capacity expansion, while
the coefficient for the effect of regulatory reforms with an independent regulator, (R)
is once again statistically insignificant and negative, and the privatisation variable (P)
also has a negative sign.
The interaction results confirm that performance improvement following private
participation is dependent on the deepening of regulatory reforms if there is a lack of
competition. The PR variable is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, a
result that is consistent with the argument that private generators will feel their
investment is less likely to be devalued or expropriated where there is an independent
regulator instead of direct government control of the sector. They are therefore more
willing to invest in capacity building. Privatisation on its own, however, has
seemingly a negative effect on installed generating capacity, underlining the
importance of competition and regulation. Private participation in a more competitive
industrial structure (PC) has a positive effect on installed capacity. The results for
the interaction of regulation and competition (RC) are also consistent with those for
electricity generation per capita in finding a negative effect, in this case reducing
installed generating capacity. This time the coefficient is statistically significant (at
the 10% level), implying that regulation can actually impair the positive effects of
competition. This may be explained by inefficiencies in the operation of regulation in
developing countries, for example the existence of regulatory regimes that protect
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existing suppliers from competition. Recent research by the World Bank has stressed
the damaging effects that poor regulation can have on economic growth (World Bank,
2005).
The effects of GDP per capita and urbanisation on capacity expansion are significant
and positive, as is the coefficient for industrialisation in one of the results. These
results are in line with expectation, as are the results for both the economic risk and
the export orientation variables. Countries with lower economic risk and with
economies more open to exporting seem to be associated with higher installed
generating capacity. This confirms that economies with better protected property
rights, smaller government, access to sound money and greater freedom to trade
internationally are more conducive to private investment in electricity generation.
Labour productivity
Turning to columns 5 and 6 of Table 2, the competition variable (C) in the estimations
is shown to have a positive impact on electricity generation per employee. However,
private participation alone does not seem to lead to higher productivity and indeed the
negative sign on P suggests the alternative, although it is statistically insignificant.
The regulation variable is also statistically insignificant except when the interaction
terms are introduced. With the interaction terms the results suggest that a more
independent regulator is associated with higher labour productivity except where
competition is also strong. In this case, the regulatory reforms may be reversing some
of the productivity gains introduced by competition, perhaps by restricting the extent
to which competition removes overmanning. Regulators may be given an objective
by government of reducing unemployment or may introduce regulations that lead to
increased manning. In contrast, regulation and private participation together (PR) do
seem to lead to increased labour productivity. The overmanning may therefore be
centred on regulated state-owned generators.
Perhaps surprisingly the variable for the interaction between competition and
privatisation (PC), while having the expected positive sign, is statistically
insignificant. But considered alongside the positive competition (C) variable and
negative privatisation variable (P), the result is consistent with the view that labour
productivity is most likely to rise when generators are privatised into a competitive
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environment. Once again the GDP and export variables are significant and have the
expected sign. The degree of industrialisation and urbanisation and the economic risk
variables, however, do not appear to have a significant effect on labour productivity.
Capacity utilisation
In a capital-intensive industry like electricity generation, a labour productivity
measure needs to be supplemented by a measurement of capital productivity. The
results for the ratio of electricity generated to generating capacity are reported in
Table 2 columns 7 and 8. They confirm, once again, that private investment and
independent regulation on their own have little obvious effects on performance and
that competition is the most important variable. In these results the interaction effect
between privatisation and regulation (PR) is also once again statistically significant,
confirming that in the absence of competition performance improvements following
the involvement of the private sector may be heavily dependent upon having in place
effective regulation. Indeed, for this set of results competition and the interaction of
privatisation and regulation dominate in terms of explaining improved capacity
utilisation.
To add further detail, Table 3 provides estimates of the quantitative effects of the
individual reform variables calculated on the basis of the results in Table 2.14 As some
of the coefficients of the reform variables are not statistically significant, the calculation
was based on the significant ones only.
(Table 3 here)
6. Discussion
More and more developing countries are thinking of, or have already undertaken,
reforms in their electricity industry with the objectives of increasing private capital,
promoting competition and introducing new regulatory structures. This study is based
on a data base especially created from a range of international sources to measure the
effects of privatisation, regulation and competition on performance in electricity
14 We thank a referee for suggesting this extension to the reporting of our results.
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generation in developing countries. Data were collected for 36 countries covering the
period 1985 to 2003. The empirical results presented show consistently that
competition in electricity generation is more important than privatisation or the
establishment of independent regulation in bringing about performance
improvements.
Reviewing our findings in more detail and in relation to the research hypotheses, we
did not find that privatisation leads to improved labour productivity or to higher
capital utilisation (Hypothesis P1) or to more generating capacity and higher output
(Hypothesis P2), except where it is coupled with the existence of an independent
regulator. But regulation on its own also seemed to have little significant effect on the
performance variables (Hypotheses R1 and R2). In other words, when competition is
weak, performance improvements from private participation seem to be dependent
upon having an effective regulatory regime in place to stimulate management to
improve performance. In contrast, independent regulation without privatisation, in
effect regulation of state-owned enterprises, seems to be ineffective. This result is not
surprising when we bear in mind that where government is the operator of enterprises,
the existence of independent regulation may lack credibility. Regulatory decisions are
subject to being overridden where they impact adversely on state industries and
budgets. Independent regulation may then become little more than a sham.
In contrast to the results for regulation and privatisation, our findings do confirm
strongly the overwhelming importance of increasing competition to promote
improved performance, in terms of greater electricity generation, generating capacity
and improved labour productivity and capital utilisation in developing countries
(Hypotheses C1 and C2). In our results competition dominated as the explanation of
performance in electricity generation. Although it is possible that managerial
discretion and “x-inefficiency” could reduce the beneficial effects of competition on
performance, our results are consistent with the view that competition is very
beneficial.
.
Our results complement earlier research into electricity generation. Like Bortolotti et
al. (1998) and Pollitt (1997) we conclude that in the absence of competition, effective
regulation is crucial to the success of privatisation. In our results, as in Cubbin and
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Stern (2006), regulation is associated with higher per capita generation capacity
levels, but only when private operators exist. Like Yunos and Hawdon (1997) our
results are consistent with state-owned suppliers performing as well as private sector
companies in the absence of complementary reforms. However, unlike Bergara et al.
(1997) our measures of the institutional conditions in different countries (economic
risk and export orientation) were less consistently associated with performance. This
may be because in our study the reform variables, especially competition, were
capturing some of the effect of the institutional conditions researched by Yunos and
Hawdon, or it could be a reflection of using different institutional measures. This
deserves further investigation given the current emphasis in the development literature
on the importance of institutions.
The results on the relative roles of privatisation, regulation and competition are also
very similar to those found by Wallsten (2001), Gutierrez and Berg (2000) and
Bortolotti et al., 2002) for the telecommunications sector. For example, Wallsten
concludes that competition is beneficial for economic performance, but that
privatisation is beneficial only when coupled with the existence of an independent
regulator. Our results do differ from those of Steiner (2000), who was concerned with
electricity generation in 19 OECD countries and found that capacity utilisation was
higher under private ownership. However, this is not entirely unexpected as
differences are likely between developed and developing economies. Differences in
the results may reflect a superior management of the privatisation process in OECD
economies, with their more developed governmental and capital market institutions.
Moreover, we would expect independent regulation to be more fully developed (and
credible) in the OECD countries. This conclusion needs further investigation, but is
intuitively appealing given knowledge of widespread institutional weaknesses in
developing countries. It is also the case that reforming the electricity sector can be
expected to be more complex than reforming telecommunications because of the
differing technologies involved and the greater difficulties of introducing effective
competition. In telecommunications wireless technology has helped to circumvent the
incumbent’s ownership of the fixed line network. However, in electricity new market
entrants must obtain access to the existing transmission and distribution systems.
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The results have policy implications for electricity reformers in developing countries.
They suggest that in developing countries performance improvements in electricity
generation are more assured when competition is promoted or, failing that,
independent regulation is instituted. Because competition is confirmed as the most
reliable means of improving performance, this suggests that the use in a number of
developing countries of exclusivity periods granted to new generators and long-term
purchase contracts for IPPs, arranged so as to stimulate investment, may be unwise.
Such measures may dim efficiency incentives and reduce economic performance by
removing the incentive of competition. It is also the case that it might be difficult to
introduce and maintain competition in the absence of privatisation because of the
incentive for government to protect its own assets from depreciation. Nevertheless,
our results suggest that privatisation without competition is likely to disappoint.
The research does, however, have a number of limitations, which we acknowledge.
To begin with, the sample is composed of developing countries (including five
emerging transitional economies) for which we could obtain data on regulation,
competition and privatisation to create our variables. There will be sample selection
bias if the countries making this data available have differing results for the dependent
variables than those which do not make data available. We have no reason to believe
that this should be the case, but cannot of course rule it out. Secondly, while we have
endeavoured to produce satisfactory measures of competition, regulation and
privatisation, more work would be valuable at an international level to obtain superior
measures especially on the effectiveness of regulation.
Finally, the paper has not explored the long-term developmental effects of price and
service changes in developing countries resulting from privatisation and market
liberalisation in the electricity sector. Nor has the paper developed an analysis of the
poverty and income distribution effects of privatisation. These are important issues for
developing countries, particularly in the context of the Millennium Development
Goals, and remain the subject of future research.
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Table 1: DESCRIPTION OF THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Variable Description Source
R Four-component regulatory index The Yearbook of Privatisation, Energy
Information Administration, World
Energy Council, APERC and the
World Bank.
C Square root of (100 – the market
share of the three largest
generators)
The Yearbook of Privatisation, Energy
Information Administration, World
Energy Council, APERC, the World
Bank and OLADE.
P Share of privately-owned
capacities (%)
The Yearbook of Privatisation, Energy
Information Administration, World
Energy Council, APERC and the
World Bank.
GDP GDP per capita (1995 constant
US$/person)
World Bank Development Indicators
Urbanisation Urban population as a share of the
total (%)
World Bank Development Indicators
Industrialisation Industrial output as a percentage of
GDP (%)
World Bank Development Indicators
Exports Export of goods and services as a
percentage of GDP (%)
World Bank Development Indicators
RISK The degree of economic risk The Fraser Institute
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Table 2: THE MAIN RESULTS USING FIXED EFFECTS PANEL DATA
ANALYSIS
Electricity
generation
per capita
(1) (2)
Installed
generation
capacity per
capita
(3) (4)
Electricity
generation
per
employee
(5) (6)
Generation
/ average
capacity
(7) (8)
Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 1 Equation 2
R -0.008
(1.364)
-0.007
(0.752)
-0.009
(1.413)
-0.011
(1.522)
-0.016
(0.815)
0.052
(2.050)**
0.004
(0.523)
-0.002
(0.173)
P -0.0001
(0.353)
-0.001
(1.381)
-0.00008
(0.178)
-0.003
(4.027)***
-0.0002
(0.195)
-0.002
(0.590)
0.00001
(0.026)
-0.002
(1.545)
C 0.017
(1.748)*
0.019
(1.818)*
0.034
(3.567)*
0.028
(1.875)*
0.030
(2.929)***
0.021
(2.070)**
0.046
(1.709)*
0.094
(2.856)***
RC -0.005
(1.404)
-0.006
(1.733)*
-0.02
(3.903)***
-0.002
(1.237)
PC 0.000001
(0.004)
0.0006
(3.824)***
0.0001
(0.291)
-0.0005
(1.233)
PR 0.0005
(1.781)*
0.0006
(2.580)***
0.001
(1.993)**
0.0006
(3.863)***
LGDP 0.573
(13.753)***
0.575
(13.752)***
0.527
(12.707)***
0.496
(11.78)***
0.527
(2.906)***
0.311
(2.256)**
0.046
(0.965)
0.068
(1.427)
Industri
alisation
0.006
(5.353)***
0.007
(5.476)***
0.002
(1.897)*
0.003
(2.677)
0.007
(1.225)
0.005
(1.161)
0.007
(5.201)***
0.006
(4.694)***
Urbanis
ation
-0.0008
(0.353)
0.00007
(0.027)
0.008
(3.467)***
0.013
(4.889)***
-0.012
(1.039)
-0.003
(0.385)
-0.012
(4.346)***
-0.016
(5.522)***
Export
(%of
GDP)
0.003
(4.192)***
0.003
(4.038)***
0.002
(2.713)***
0.002
(3.075)***
0.005
(2.582)**
0.003
(1.933)*
0.0007
(0.383)
-0.0009
(1.140)
Freedo
m
-0.047
(0.906)
-0.037
(0.711)
0.068
(5.690)***
0.024
(4.614)***
0.044
(0.501)
-0.034
(0.502)
-0.017
(0.579)
-0.011
(0.379)
Adjuste
d R-
squared
0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.89 0.93 0.69 0.70
D-W
test
1.74 1.73 1.79 1.79 1.81 1.83 1.74 1.73
Number
of obs
638 638 644 644 347 347 638 638
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Table 3: THE QUANTITATIVE EFFECTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL REFORM
VARIABLES
Electricity
generation per
capita
Installed
generation
capacity per
capita
Electricity
generation per
employee
Generation /
average capacity
R
One unit change in
the regulatory index
is associated with
0.05% increase
in electricity
generation per
capita
0.54%
decrease in
installed
capacity per
capita
3.30% increase
in electricity
generation per
employee
0.06%
increased in
generation/av
erage capacity
P
When the
proportion of
generation capacity
owned by private
investors increase
one percent, there
will be
0.05% increase
in electricity
generation per
capita
0.18%
decrease in
installed
capacity per
capita
0.1% increase in
electricity
generation per
employee
0.06%
increased in
generation/av
erage capacity
C
when there is one
unit change in the
measurement of the
competition
variable, there will
be
1.90% increase
in electricity
generation per
capita
2.26%
increase in
installed
capacity per
capita
0.1% increase in
electricity
generation per
employee
9.4% increased
in
generation/av
erage capacity
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Appendix
Table A1: Correlation Matrix for the Independent Variables
R C P LGDPP UB IN EX RISK
R 1.00
C .57 1.00
P .33 .45 1.00
LGDPP .18 .26 .37 1.00
UB .27 .43 .43 .65 1.00
IN -.15 .03 -.17 .26 .19 1.00
EX -.07 -.13 .31 .58 .48 .08 1.00
RISK .36 .22 .57 .50 .38 -.22 .62 1.00
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Table A2 Descriptive Statistics for the Variables
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum
LNGP 6.692 1.200 3.069 8.987
LCAP -1.512 1.175 -4.581 0.609
LGPE -0.075 0.792 -2.907 1.883
LCAPEFF 8.204 0.232 7.283 8.841
R 0.970 1.489 0.000 4.000
P 14.617 25.244 0.000 100.000
C 1.549 2.382 0.000 9.967
LGDP 0.507 1.1589 -1.812 3.340
UB 56.257 21.317 7.800 100.000
IN 31.974 9.925 12.774 66.530
EX 36.400 33.603 6.250 206.930
RISK 5.636 1.277 1.700 9.030
Table A3: Results for the Panel Unit Root Tests
Dependent Variable LNG LCAP LGPE LCAPEFF LGDP
t-bar statistics -2.1.783 -2.9400 -2.3728 -2.9635 -7.8654
The critical value at the 1% confidence level is –1.96.
L indicates logged values.
